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Abstract
Evidence suggests that as public opinion towards immigration becomes more negative, so the descriptive representation
of ethnic minority groups is increasingly restricted. Recently, some initial research into the causal mechanism hinted that
this effect is driven by patterns of candidacy. This suggests that political parties are creating an ‘ethnic penalty’ of their own
in the selection stage. This paper investigates the relationship between patterns of candidacy, party strategy, and public
opinion in Great Britain from 1997 to 2019, and proposes that ‘punitive parties’ are strongly responsible for shaping the
representational outcomes of minority groups. I find support for earlier suggestions that parties are increasingly likely to
place ethnic minority candidates away from ‘winnable’ contests as anti-immigrant hostility rises. These findings are
important for our conceptions of ethnic penalties, of party behaviour in selection processes, and for the study and
cause of improving political representation.
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Introduction
The moment in which a candidate is successfully elected is
the final step in a long, meandering river of opportunities
and processes which feed into election day, and end with
representation. Sadly, the reality in many political systems
is that the number and quality of opportunities given to
candidates is not equal across them, and the processes do
not treat everyone fairly. Prospective representatives from
certain socio-demographic, religious, and economic back-
grounds find themselves disadvantaged compared to oth-
ers, and, as such, electoral success is too often biased away
from too many. Political parties are charged with being
‘gatekeepers’ to representation, and while they ultimately
provide the vast majority of representational opportunities,
they can also create punitive pressures on (prospective)
candidates from ‘non-traditional’ backgrounds seeking to
become representatives.
Those in less advantageous positions face what litera-
ture articulates as ‘barriers’ to representation, which can be
found from spring to estuary along the course of represen-
tation. Opportunities can be restricted at all stages, from
prospective candidacy (intention to run), all the way
through to election at the ballot box (and beyond). Many
barriers occur prior, but are intrinsically connected, to the
traditional concept of ‘ethnic penalties’ – voter-based sanc-
tions levied against minority candidates on election day as
a result of some form of prejudice or discrimination. While
much research tends to focus on those election day out-
comes (the ‘estuary’), there is a much larger size and spread
of interconnected and interdependent exclusionary forces
pushing against minority-group participation (the
‘upstream’).
This research contributes to the literature by developing
a framework for ‘punitive parties’, who will strategically
discriminate against ethnic minority candidates when they
deem it electorally prudent to do so. I find strong evidence
that there is a systematic and quantifiable pattern of polit-
ical parties positioning minority candidates away from
‘winnable’ contests in areas where the public displays less
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tolerance for diversity. In short, parties are moving minor-
ity candidates away from seats where they perceive that
their non-white appearance might ‘cost’ the party a result.
Further, from some preliminary analysis on 2019 candidate
data, there is a suggestion that the relationship affects Black
candidates to a greater degree than others. I argue that this
combination of public opinion and party strategy is one of
the most significant blockages to electing parliaments
which fully reflect the ethnic diversity of their populations,
and works in tandem with (and drives) other exclusionary
forces.
Political (under) representation
While in recent years improvements have certainly been
made in making parliaments across advanced democracies
more reflective of the ethnic diversity in their populations,
minority ethnic groups still remain under-represented in the
legislative chambers of the vast majority of developed
countries (Bird et al., 2010; Bloemraad and Schönwälder,
2013; Ruedin, 2013). Britain, as one such under-
representative political system, provides an excellent case
study to examine the wider development of minority-group
representation in Western democracies and its socio-
cultural and (party) political barriers. The country has a
long history of immigration and multiculturalism, signifi-
cant public anxiety and controversy over migration, a loca-
lised majoritarian electoral system, and highly favourably
voting (and, prior to 1983, citizenship) rights given to
immigrants from former colonies in Africa and Asia
(Bloemraad and Schönwälder, 2013; Ford, 2011; Ford
et al., 2015; Meer and Modood, 2009; Modood, 1997; Sag-
gar, 2004). If parties are negatively impacting representa-
tional opportunities and outcomes here, it is highly likely
that the same could be happening in other countries with
comparable political (party) systems, histories, popula-
tions, and public contention with (non-white) immigration
and ethnic diversity.
The term ‘ethnic minority’ in the British context is
effectively a synonym for demographic groups with non-
white racial backgrounds (Heath et al., 2013; Modood,
1997; Nimmi, 1991). This differs to concepts of
immigrant-origin minorities, which includes white immi-
grant groups such as mainland European immigrants, or
other ethnic minority backgrounds without racial minority
status, such as Travellers or Gypsy communities (Bloem-
raad and Schönwälder, 2013; English, 2019a, 2019b). The
study of ethnic minority groups and their socio-political
integration has long been the focus of academic work and
high-profile civil society and political debate (Hepple,
1968; Modood, 1994; Saggar, 2003; Solomos, 1989).
Despite this long and very public history of concern, even
after the recent 2019 British General Election the number
of Members of Parliament (MPs) from ethnic minority
backgrounds is still only around 50% of the total needed
for the House of Commons to fully reflect its population in
terms of ‘descriptive’ representation (Mansbridge, 1999;
Pitkin, 1967). In the narrow sense, this means that the pres-
ence of non-white MPs in elected positions across British
politics does not reflect the presence of non-white popula-
tions living in the country (Banducci et al., 2004; English,
2019b; Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Sobolewska, 2013),
and in a broader sense, it is also the case that minority
groups remain under-represented in positions of authority,
power and leadership in the British parliamentary system
(English, 2019a).
A range of issues arise when ethnic minority groups are
systematically disadvantaged and shut out: declining par-
ticipation and feelings of ‘belonging’ and ‘legitimacy’ in
the political system (English et al., 2019; Gay, 2001, 2002;
Martiniello, 2005),1 reduction in responsiveness to (ethnic
minority) constituents (Costa, 2017; McKee, 2019), and
overlooking of minority-group issues and concerns in pol-
icy and decision making (Mansbridge, 1999; Sobolewska
et al., 2018). Increasing diversity in parliament is a widely
agreed strategic and normative goal among British political
parties (Sobolewska, 2013), and among political elites and
institutions across the democratised world (Banducci et al.,
2004; Bird et al., 2010; Bloemraad and Schönwälder,
2013). Further, Saggar and Geddes (2000) argued that
increasing representation and participation is mediated by
and can in turn affect the political institutional context, and
bring issues of race politics out from ‘the margins’ and into
the mainstream of ‘political life and political analysis’.
Higher descriptive representation is also connected to
stronger substantive representation of minority groups,
which impacts (the prevalence of) debates and discussions
on salient topics for these typically excluded groups, such
as racial discrimination, justice, immigration policy, and
extremism (Saalfeld and Bischof, 2013; Sobolewska
et al., 2018).
Under-representation in political systems is usually
understood as being caused by either ‘supply’ side or
‘demand’ side factors (Sobolewska, 2013; Norris and Love-
nduski, 1995). While before the turn of the century there was
certainly problem in terms of supply of candidates coming
forward from ‘non-traditional’ backgrounds (Norris and
Lovenduski, 1995), this situation has undoubtedly improved
in recent years (Sobolewska, 2013). Around 95 MPs would
need to be non-White British to ‘reflect’ the size of the
minority-ethnic British population (which is estimated at
around 14.5% in England and Wales, according to the most
recent Annual Population Survey results).2 As such, the 138
minority candidates standing for election almost a decade
ago in 2010 (Fisher et al., 2014) demonstrates no real short-
age in terms of supply for minority group representation. The
potential stock of MPs is certainly there. We are therefore
left to investigate the possibility that demand-side influences
hold back representation.
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Ethnic penalties in existing literature
The potential for voters to punish candidates from minority
ethnic backgrounds is what is known as the ‘ethnic penalty’
hypothesis, and is one explanation for the under-
representation of ethnic minority candidates in British
parliament. Across a number of previous works, consistent
evidence has been found that – all else being equal – an
ethnic minority parliamentary candidate will face something
of a disadvantage at the ballot box due to voter discrimina-
tion in British elections (Curtice et al., 2018; Fisher et al.,
2014; Martin and Blinder, 2020; Norris et al., 1992;
Stegmaier et al., 2013; Thrasher et al., 2015). Voter
prejudice might be ‘active’ in terms of outright hostility
towards ethnic minority groups, or more subtle in terms of
in-group favourability or competency judgements (Fisher
et al., 2014). So, in situations where their party might be
increasing its vote share across the board, non-white candi-
dates appear to see their individual increases limited relative
to their white colleagues. Equally, when a party is declining
nationally, often it is the case that ethnic minority candidates
will be hit hardest by said decline. This systematic disadvan-
tage will make it harder for ethnic minority candidates to
gain election, slowing the course of representation.
Punitive racial-based voting in Britain has been detected
as recently as the 2017 General Election, with Curtice et al.
(2018: 460) finding that the Conservative party were up by
an average on only 1.6 points when fielding a newly chal-
lenging ethnic minority Conservative candidate, compared
to an average of 5.2 when the candidate’s ethnicity was not
changed. In survey research during the run-up to the same
election, Martin and Blinder (2020) also found evidence of
voter discrimination against minority ethnic candidates –
specifically those from Pakistani backgrounds, and Black
Caribbean background when candidates expressed support
for pro-minority policies. Furthermore, a major longitudi-
nal study from Thrasher et al. (2015) also detected ethnic
penalties in local authority elections, and concluded that it
was ‘undoubtable’ that electoral contests were being
decided on the basis of voter discrimination against ‘non-
British sounding’ candidates in council elections ranging
from 1973 through to 2012.
In the wake of the 2001 and 2005 Islamic terrorist
attacks on New York and London respectively, Fisher
et al. (2014) investigated voter discrimination against Mus-
lim candidates at the 2010 General Election. They summar-
ise their findings by stating that ‘evidence from the last
general election shows that white British voters, on aver-
age, are less willing to vote for ethnic minority candidates,
especially Muslim candidates’, and further, that the ‘rela-
tive unwillingness of specifically anti-immigrant whites to
vote for Muslim candidates, together with the known pos-
itive association between anti-immigrant sentiment and
Islamophobia, suggests that the Muslim-candidate electoral
penalty is driven by prejudice and discrimination’ (Fisher
et al., 2014: 900). This individual-level unwillingness to
vote for minority candidates on the part of white-majority
voters collects and then drives the punitive effects noted at
the aggregate-level.
However, Fisher et al. (2014) did also argue that ethnic
penalties were in all ‘difficult to detect’ and unlikely to
have had much influence on the actual result of (General)
election contests. This is a view shared across much of the
literature on ballot box ethnic discrimination, with Sobo-
lewska (2013: 622) stating that ‘the significance of the
ethnic penalty might be overstated’ in current research.
Stegmaier et al. (2013) too argued that sometimes race ‘did
not matter’ when explaining electoral outcomes, and that
existence and extents of ethnic penalties depended on
highly specific contextual arrangements of candidates, eth-
nicities, and voters. As such, scholarship has largely closed
the door on the potential for ethnic penalty effects to be
dictating representational outcomes.
Broadening the penalty framework:
Punitive parties
This research does not attempt to challenge the general
consensus regarding the influence of voter penalties on
election outcomes, but focusing on the punitive behaviour
of voters alone misses much of the discriminatory structur-
ing of representational opportunities and outcomes that
occurs prior to the moment of that ballot box contest. These
‘upstream’ effects are actually an important factor in mask-
ing and mediating penalty sizes measured at the ballot box
in previous research. In other words, the limited size and
scale of ethnic penalty effects is a consequence of their
much larger actually potential size – a potential which is
to some extent known and being strategically avoided by
political parties (Durose et al,. 2011; English, 2019b; Sobo-
lewska, 2013). It is in that direction which this research
turns the conversation, and proposes the idea of ‘punitive
parties’ who act to restrict opportunities for minority can-
didates when it is (deemed) strategically beneficial to do so.
Political parties are often charged with being ‘gate-
keepers’ to representation (Bloemraad and Schönwälder,
2013; Caul, 1999; Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Sobo-
lewska, 2013), and in the British context, candidate nomi-
nations are generally carried out and determined by local
branches and organisations of political parties, who exer-
cise a great deal of autonomy in this regard. As Sobolewska
(2013: 620) writes, Labour and Conservative candidate
selection for British General Elections has normally been
a ‘multi-stage process’, where a nationally approved and
vetted list of candidates can ‘apply for local election’.
Selection for individual constituencies is then handled by
the local parties themselves, who draw up short-lists for
local party members to vote on. There have been some
exceptions to this general structure over the study period,
such as the suspension of centralised candidate approval by
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Labour in 2015 (handing more control directly to local
parties), and the use of ‘open primaries’ in some Conser-
vative safe seats in recent elections (Criddle, 2016,
Alexandre-Collier, 2016). It is not entirely unheard of for
central party authorities to propose candidates to local
branches and push them into selecting them – for example,
the Conservative ‘A-List’ strategy in 2010 (Hill, 2013).
However, in general, the process is much more delicate and
consensual than in most other political systems where cen-
tral party authority can be (almost) unilaterally exercised
on candidate selection procedures (Hazan and Rahat, 2010;
Sobolewska, 2013).
The suggestion that ‘non-traditional’ candidates can and
do face disadvantage and discrimination in the candidate
selection process is hardly novel nor controversial. Nor is
it novel or controversial to assert how important this element
of the representational story is: ‘party nomination serves as a
choke point that will either close off entrants or, alternately,
open up the pathway into politics’ (Tolley, 2019: 70). Scho-
larship has consistently highlighted how women, ethnic
minority, and (more recently) disabled would-be election
candidates are treated poorly or shut out entirely in the selec-
tion and election process by political parties and their nomi-
nation strategies (Evans and Reher, 2020; Shah, 2014;
Tolley, 2019). This is often put down to the impact of exclu-
sionary, closed networks among party elites, socio-economic
inequalities meaning participation and networking become
(or are) more challenging for under-represented groups, and
outright discrimination and prejudice.
The contribution of this research is to bring public opin-
ion into the heart of our accounts of discrimination within
the selection process, and place this mechanism in a wider
punitive framework concerning selection and election. There
is growing evidence attesting to the impact that public opin-
ion and attitudes towards diversity and difference has on
mediating the advancement of minority representation in
British politics. Geddes (1998: 152) first proposed that the
descriptive representation of ethnic minorities may be tem-
pered by public opinion, writing that ‘if the prevailing
national mood is hostile [toward ethnic minority participa-
tion] . . . this will place constraints on political opportunity’.
Following from this, both Ruedin (2009, 2013) and English
(2019b) found evidence for this effect. Ruedin (2009, 2013)
studied the relationship between antiimmigrant sentiments
and minority group representation in cross-national perspec-
tive, and found that (2009: 249) ‘Cultural attitudes – partic-
ularly when measured as positive attitudes towards
marginalised groups in society in general – appear to be the
key driver of ethnic representation in national parliaments’.
English (2019b: 18) systemically analysed the relationship
between levels of representation for ethnic minorities in
British politics and public opinion towards immigration at
five elections from 1992 to 2010, and concluded that a more
hostile ‘public opinion does have a significant negative
impact on the representation of ethnic minority [immigrant
origin] groups’.
Though we have evidence that the two factors are indeed
related, we have only minimal insights into the underlying
process. In other words, away from ballot-box penalties,
there are significant gaps in our understanding about how
public opinion restricts representational opportunities.
While evidence suggests that public opinion and represen-
tation are connected, the casual mechanism is as yet uncov-
ered, and a full theoretical framework not yet developed.
There was some suggestion of what may be happening in
this regard again from English (2019b), who ran a prelim-
inary analysis on parliamentary candidates which demon-
strated the possibility of candidate-level impacts of public
opinion on representation. This research proposed, in line
with a very similar argument put forward by Durose et al.
(2011: 93), that increasingly hostile local public attitudes
towards diversity and difference may well be noticed by
local party selectors, who may then in turn avoid selecting a
minority candidate for fear of an electoral backlash.
From this, we can build an expectation that if local
parties anticipate that a non-white candidate might not be
so well received in their constituency because of local
issues, grievances, about and/or hostility towards diversity
and difference, then – if the party had something to lose (in
that they either hold the seat or it is a marginal they are
contesting) – the chances of an ethnic minority candidate
being selected will decrease. In this sense, and if this sug-
gestion matches reality, parties become exclusionary and
will discriminate against minority candidates when they
deem it electorally prudent to do so. If parties are acting
as exclusionary forces, then they and their reactions to
(perceived) public opinion must also be considered puni-
tive. This mechanism is the ‘punitive parties’ element of
wider restrictions and barriers that ethnic minority candi-
dates face when seeking election – including exclusionary
forces noted in previous selection literature, and voter
penalties.
This strategic discrimination would in turn have an
impact on actual ethnic penalties measured at the ballot
box. If parties are anticipating and seeking to avoid them,
then we would detect fewer penalties. Thus, the limited size
and scale of ethnic penalty effects measured in existing
literature (Fisher et al., 2014; Sobolewska, 2013) is a con-
sequence of their much larger potential, which is being
strategically avoided by political parties (Durose et al.,
2011; English, 2019b; Sobolewska, 2013). Furthermore,
the strategic angle to such discrimination could also be used
by parties to mask, justify, or motivate some of the preju-
dicial and exclusionary practices occurring elsewhere in the
selection process as discussed above. Each of these ethnic-
based barriers and blockages to representation can be
viewed as part of the same punitive framework and
mechanisms of exclusion.
4 Party Politics XX(X)
Empirical evidence
Data
To test the expectation that higher public hostility towards
diversity and difference restricts the selection opportunities
of ethnic minority candidates, regression analysis was con-
ducted on a unique and extensive database covering election
candidates and public opinion since 1997. Figures are aggre-
gated to the regional level, for reasons detailed below and in
the Online Appendix (mainly due to constraints on the public
opinion data). The dependent variable in the analysis is the
number of ethnic minority candidates fielded in ‘winnable’
seats in each region at each election by either the Labour or
Conservative parties. These are the only two political parties
to have contested every constituency in each General Elec-
tion,3 and have provided the overwhelming majority of eth-
nic minority candidates and MPs, over the study period
(Sobolewska, 2013). Candidate ethnic (minority) status is
as determined and recorded by data collectors using online
visual information (from social media, candidate pages,
news articles, and so on).4 It is not a measurement of ethnic
self-identification.5 A seat is considered winnable at a given
election if either one of the following two conditions are
satisfied: 1) the party for which the minority candidate is
standing already holds the seat, or 2) the party for which the
minority candidate is standing requires less than a 5% swing
to win and take the seat for themselves (therefore the gap
between them and the current incumbent is 10% or less).6
Table 1 shows the total number of Labour and Conser-
vative British parliamentary candidates from 1997–2019
identified as being from ethnic minority backgrounds. It
shows an almost linear rise in the total number of ethnic
minority candidates fielded in British General Elections
over the study period, with a particularly sizeable jump
between 2010 and 2015. The Labour Party provides more
opportunities than their Conservative counterparts in four
out of seven of the elections in the study, including in the
latest two contests (2017 and 2019).
Moving below the country-wide figures, Figure 1 shows
the percentage of minority candidates positioned in win-
nable contests – competitive races in which a minority
candidate is not just fielded by a political party, but would
stand a good chance of winning – in each region at each
election time. London is far ahead of all other regions in
terms of the percentage of seats there ‘opened up’ for
minority representation. Opportunities are also (relatively)
high in the South East region, and the West Midlands
(home to Birmingham – the country’s second-largest city
and a major hub of ethnic diversity). On the other hand,
there are very few ‘winnable seat’ opportunities given to
minority candidates in Wales, the North East, the South
West, or the East Midlands.
Public opinion is measured from harmonised and aggre-
gated survey data on attitudes towards immigration from
five high-quality, longitudinal sources.7 The database
includes questions covering immigration levels, the impact
of immigration on the British economy and society, views
on immigration levels and impacts from specific immigrant
groups, family reunification, repatriation, and the impact
and influence of immigration on the British labour market.
Individual responses were analysed and aggregated to the
national8 and regional levels using an updated (by the
author) version of Professor James Stimson’s (1991) ‘dyad
ratios’ algorithm in the R statistical software programme.
The algorithm allows us to estimate the ‘latent attitude’
towards immigration which runs through a range of other-
wise incomparable sources, questions, and respondent
answers, by harmonising measurement of the change in
responses to repeated questions over time in a process sim-
ilar to a factor analysis.9
To be included in the question series database, a ques-
tion must have been repeated at least three times over the
study period. A full documentation of the question items,
their sources, and their wording can be found in the Online
Appendix. The topic of immigration is used as the measure-
ment for public opinion on diversity and difference – rather
than a measurement of race relations and/or multicultural-
ism for three reasons. Firstly, immigration opinions have
been connected to ethnic minority candidacy opportunities
in previous literature (English, 2019b). Secondly, question
coverage on issues specifically of race and race-relations
alone is not sufficient enough to create a long and stable
time series over the study period at the national and
regional levels. There are only a handful of repeated items
asked in these survey sources which can be conceptualised
as pertaining to race relations or tolerance of ethnic diver-
sity across the last 40 years. Thirdly, overall, attitudes
towards all racial, ethnic, and non-native out-groups tend
to move and scale well together and follow similar patterns
(in trend, if not level) over time (Ford, 2008; Meuleman
et al., 2009), and immigration question series have been
used as a proxy measurement for attitudes towards other
(and more general) out-groups in previous literature







1997 11 13 25 2%
2001 19 15 35 2.7%
2005 33 41 74 5.9%
2010 46 44 89 7.1%
2015 53 62 115 9.1%
2017 63 43 106 8.4%
2019 76 69 143 11.3%
Sources: Pippa Norris Election Databases (1997, 2001, 2005 and 2010),
the Parliamentary Candidates Study (2015, 2017, and in combination with
the author’s own data collection 2019). See Databases section for full
references.
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(Jennings, 2009). This latter point is demonstrated in the
Online Appendix to this research through the construction
of a ‘race relations and xenophobia’ time series (using the
10 items from the above sources plus the Eurobarometer)
which is then compared to the immigration measurement at
the national level. Large regions are the most practical level
at which to work with these aggregated data, and this
approach to measuring opinions towards out-groups in
Britain has been taken previously by English (2019b),
Drinkwater et al. (2013), Van Hauwaert and English
(2018), and Markaki and Longhi (2013).10 This research
continues the tradition of using the large Government
Office Regions, or NUTS111 regions, for breaking out and
analysing regional public opinion in Britain.
Figure 2 shows regional level opinions over time in
Britain since 1990. This represents data for the key inde-
pendent variable used in the regression analysis. Attitudes
in London and Scotland for instance remain systematically
more positive than other regions, while – with the excep-
tion of the final few years in the study – attitudes in regions
such as Wales and the North East are much less positive on
average. Some regions do not see such a dramatic turn in
the later years as others, with Yorkshire and the Humber,
the South West, and the North West remaining fairly low
on the scale compared to others such as the South East and
the West Midlands as the study period concludes.
Four additional control variables (alongside a dummy
variable for each election to account for the panelled nature
of the research design, and a further dummy variable for
party) were as follows: (1) the share of the population iden-
tifying as from an ethnic minority background in the region
at each election year, (2) latent support for the anti-
immigrant parties, (3) urbanisation and population density,
and (4) the number of incumbents retiring/stepping aside.
Controlling for ethnic minority populations and urbanisation
provides an account for the extent to which minority groups
are able to effectively mobilise and participate in the polit-
ical system, with both higher ethnic diversity and urban
density previously connected to better localised opportuni-
ties and outcomes for representation (Martin, 2016; Saggar
and Geddes, 2000; Sobolewska, 2013). The figures for non-
white populations come from the UK Census (1991, 2001,
and 2011) and the Annual Population Survey (2005, 2015,
2017, and 2019). For urbanisation, a dummy variable for the
presence of an urban area within the region containing over
2-million people was leveraged.12
Bringing in a measure of anti-immigrant party activity
accounts for the impact that local contexts of anti-
immigrant mobilisation might have: as outlined in English
(2019b), a hostile climate could both increase (in terms of a
counter-mobilisation to defend interests) and decrease
(suppress the desire of immigrant groups to engage in the
hostile, unwelcoming political system) local incentives to
stand for parliament. Strong local anti-immigrant move-
ments could also contribute to parties’ strategic judgement
about positioning minority candidates in winnable seats.
The figures used are the combined vote shares for the Brit-
ish National Party, United Kingdom Independence Party,
Figure 1. Number of ethnic minority candidates in winnable positions, per region. Source: Pippa Norris Election Databases (1997,
2001, 2005 and 2010) and the Parliamentary Candidates Study (2015, 2017 and in combination with the author’s own data collection for
2019). See Online Appendix for full references.
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and the Brexit Party at the European Elections prior to the
(General) election year. Using results from ‘second-order’
elections such as this is a more effective measurement of
latent potential support for parties who are otherwise often
‘squeezed out’ in General Election contests (Hobolt and
Spoon, 2012; Reif and Schmitt, 1980). Finally, though it
is not completely unheard of for sitting MPs (previously
successful candidates) to move constituencies or to be
deselected for the upcoming election by their local parties,
the number of opportunities for ethnic minority candidates
finding winnable contests to compete in will naturally be
much higher when a greater number of incumbents stand
down ahead of the election (Shah, 2014; Sobolewska,
2013).13 Therefore, the final control variable counts the
number of seats without incumbents standing ahead of the
election.
Modelling strategy
As the dependent variable was a count measurement, taken
at the party level, with two observations in each region per
election creating a ‘repeated measures’ panel design to the
data,14 the relationship was estimated using a Bayesian
Poisson regression model with a panel structure specifica-
tion.15 The log transformation of the total number of seats
which were ‘winnable’ for each party at the regional level
at each election was used as the offset variable. This
accounts for the fact that many regions will provide more
winnable contest opportunities overall for Labour and Con-
servative candidates (mostly through having far more seats,
such as the South East) than others (for instance, Scotland
since 2015).16 Weakly-informative prior probabilities were
established through simulation and cross-referencing with
the limited existing research on the relationship between
public opinion and representational outcomes.17 The
expectation was that a non-zero, positive, relationship
would be found between increasingly open and tolerant
local attitudes towards immigration and higher numbers
of ethnic minority candidates fielded in winnable seats at
British elections over the last two decades. For further ref-
erence, the model workflow (including establishing priors),
model postestimation figures, alternative Bayesian model
specifications and frequentist models using the otherwise
same specification can be found in the Online Appendix.
Regression analysis
Table 2 shows the regression results, with the estimate
column representing the mean coefficient size from the
posterior distributions. The second numeric column shows
the standard deviation of the posterior distribution of each
parameter estimate. The intervals reported are 89% cred-
ible intervals.18 The coefficient of 3.2 for the public opin-
ion variable indicates that our number of expected ethnic
minority candidates fielded in winnable positions will
increase by around 25 if a region moves from entirely
restrictive in its opinions to entirely open. The credible
intervals do not cross zero,19 and suggest that there is an
89% probability that the effect-size is between 1.5 and
4.9.20 This gives us strong evidence in favour of a positive
relationship between public opinion and opportunities for
ethnic minority candidates to stand and achieve
Figure 2. Public opinion on immigration in British regions. Per region: 163 observations across 24 time series. Eigenvalue estimates
range from around 50% to 75% of variance explained. Data from the BES, BSA, EVS, WVS, and ESS harmonised and aggregated by the
author using the Stimson dyad-ratio algorithm. For full descriptive statistics on measurements and data citations, see the Online
Appendix.
English 7
representation. Our prior expectation is therefore met, and
we have more than sufficient evidence to credibly reject the
suggestion that the relationship between public opinion and
candidate selection is zero (or negative).
There are important relationships between ethnic minor-
ity candidate opportunities and ethnic diversity and anti-
immigrant party strength. These estimated coefficients of
4.7 and 6.0 respectively confirm prior expectations that the
potential stock of minority representatives and counter-
mobilisation impetus are important factors in the represen-
tation story. There is no relationship to speak of between
increased probability of ethnic minority candidates being
fielded in winnable positions and higher urbanisation/pop-
ulation density. Though, as previously noted, any urban
density measurement correlates highly with diversity
metrics, and so much of this effect is likely being captured
by the non-white population model parameter. Finally, the
Labour Party coefficient is positive, and the intervals do not
contain zero. This suggests that ethnic minority candidates
in winnable positions are more likely to be Labour candi-
dates, and therefore confirms previous suggestions and
observations regarding the Labour Party providing more
opportunities for successful minority descriptive represen-
tation at General Elections.
Difference in effects between ethnic minority groups
Ethnic minority communities are not a homogeneous group
in terms of their backgrounds, socio-political views and
experiences, and representation. There are numerous
groups within the ethnic minority umbrella, each with their
own distinct histories and experiences of the British polit-
ical system and those (particularly from the majority group)
organising, voting, and representing within it (Fisher et al.,
2014; Ford, 2011; Storm et al., 2017; Uberoi, 2020). It is
therefore important that research reflects this, and at this
point I turn to investigate how the above observed relation-
ship might differ by major ethnic group.
The body of minority-ethnic candidates is not suffi-
ciently large enough and the data not specific enough about
their background in the earlier period of this study to per-
form group-level analysis in this research. However, for the
latest election, candidate ethnic background data is disag-
gregated into four categories with healthy counts in each:
White, Asian, Black, and all Others. Figure 3 shows the
relationship between public opinion on immigration (scale
reversed this time, so that higher values indicate more
restrictive aggregate opinions) and the number of candi-
dates in ‘winnable’ contests by major ethnic minority group
as it appears in the 2019 data.
The data suggest that while candidates from all major
ethnic minority backgrounds appear to have fewer oppor-
tunities where public opinion becomes more restrictive, the
slope is particularly steep for black candidates. On average,
where public opinion is least restrictive, a party will field
on average around two or three Black candidates in win-
nable positions. Where it was most restrictive, the average
number of Black candidates in winnable positions comes
down – on average – to zero. Simple multivariate regres-
sion analysis on these data points (controlling for candidate
party in addition to public opinion) confirmed negative
slopes for all groups, but Black candidates were the only
group with a coefficient credibly/significantly away from
zero.21 This is an important first insight into how the rela-
tionship between public attitudes and candidate opportuni-
ties may play out differently for candidates from different
ethnic backgrounds, but further and more rigorous research
(including more elections and a formal modelling process)
is required (and strongly encouraged) before any firm con-
clusions can be made.
Discussion
This research aimed to make two substantial, simultaneous
contributions. Firstly, I aimed to demonstrate that there has
been a systematic impact of public opinion on patterns of
minority candidacy in British elections over the past 23
years. This in turn aimed to develop existing suggestions
that the previously observed relationship between higher
rates of anti-immigrant public opinion and lower levels of
descriptive representation was being driven by this strate-
gic placement of minority candidates away from ‘win-
nable’ contests in contexts of higher public hostility
towards immigration. The empirical research suggests that
there is indeed a substantively important relationship
between public opinion and candidate opportunities, and
that we can expect ethnic minority candidates to be system-
atically disadvantaged when public opinion is at its most
restrictive. Preliminary evidence also suggests that it is








Intercept 6.917 0.627 7.941 5.931
Public Opinion 3.201 1.062 1.527 4.927
Ethnic Diversity 4.711 0.953 3.193 6.209
Anti-Immigrant Parties 6.049 1.178 4.198 7.955
Labour Candidates 0.795 0.139 0.577 1.017
Major Urban Centre 0.01 0.187 0.289 0.302
Open Seats 0.152 0.077 0.024 0.269
Election: 2001 0.435 0.38 0.162 1.039
Election: 2005 0.305 0.373 0.895 0.282
Election: 2010 0.277 0.348 0.277 0.829
Election: 2015 0.205 0.372 0.388 0.802
Election: 2017 0.13 0.381 0.741 0.493
Election: 2019 0.706 0.451 1.422 0.035
Intervals are 89% credible intervals. Weakly informative priors set, see
Online Appendix for work-flow details. 150 observations.
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Black candidates in particular who may find themselves
‘shut out’ most when local publics are more hostile.
Secondly, I aimed to position this strategic placement of
ethnic minority candidates away from winnable contests –
the ‘punitive parties’ conception – at the centre of our
frameworks for minority candidate opportunities and
restrictions. As well as measurable and influential in their
own right, these strategic considerations and manoeuvres
may also explain a) why ballot-box ethnic penalties are not
as substantially large as we might expect (because parties
anticipate them and avoid giving voters the change to pro-
duce larger ones), and b) why party elites will work strate-
gically and carefully themselves open and close
opportunities for increasing diversity among candidates
and parliamentarians, in turn creating strict and narrow
conditions and opportunities for electoral success for
minority candidates when party elites are not actively help-
ing their cause (either nationally or locally).
That said, there is still much to do in terms of future
research. These measures and findings are aggregations of
phenomena which are ostentatiously driven at a much more
individual/localised level. So, though the data shows strong
support for the prior expectations outlined in this research
and in previous literature, this predicates a certain arrange-
ment of action and agency at the individual and party-
selectorate level which aggregate analysis is not able to
explain. It is assumed in this analysis that patterns of can-
didacy measured and correlated at the regional level with
public opinion is in fact caused by decision making by
party selectors. But patterns of candidacy like this could
also be caused by decision making processes by candidates
themselves – perhaps it is the case that minority candidates
are simply not contesting selection when local public opin-
ion is more hostile. Future research should proceed on this
track and investigate and challenge those assumptions. One
potential dynamic that this study was not able to test is the
effect that individual (prospective) candidate ideologies
might have on this relationship. Following from findings
shown by Martin and Blinder (2020), could it be that an
ethnic minority (prospective) candidate who takes strong
and active positions on issues of race, ethnicity, and racial
justice will be hindered by the effects noted in this paper to
a greater extent than a minority (prospective) candidate
who tries to plays down or avoid discussing these issues?
Further, could the effect be mitigated or exacerbated by
their parties’ own policy/ideological positions on issues
of racial equality and representation?
Following research should also look to expand on the
very preliminary findings in the final empirical section of
this paper regarding the group-level dynamics of the
effects, and continue to push research into considering
diversity within diversity in its empirical frame. Lastly, at
this individual level, future research should investigate
potential concurrent and magnifying effects caused by
intersectionality – what role does gender play in explaining
these patterns, or exclusion based on social class or polit-
ical networks? These are all questions which future
research should look at and develop into a full story of the
impacts that public opinion on immigration has on the
political representation of minority groups through from
candidacy to Premiership.
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Notes
1. Though see evidence from Martin (2016) suggesting that this
effect may not be so clean-cut in British politics.
2. Available on NOMIS, details on: https://www.nomisweb.co.
uk/articles/1167.aspx
3. Aside from the seat occupied by the Speaker of the House of
Commons.
4. Given the prevalence and longevity of debates and definitions
around ethnic and ethnic minority statuses in British society,
coding of this particular variable does not tend to create many
issues or disagreements between coders. In inter-coder relia-
bility checks for the 2019 data collection, there were no dis-
crepancies recorded between coders and between the
principle investigator (the author). In later coding checks on
the full data, the author disagreed with the original coding
and, as principle investigator, changed entries only a handful
of times across hundreds of observations. Where a candi-
date’s ethnic background is coded as ‘ambiguous’ or
‘unknown’, they were left out of the statistical analysis.
5. This is of course a highly important and interesting dynamic
of ethnic status, but for the purposes of this research we are
concerned with the identification and treatment of candidates
and the dynamics of ethnicity according to voters and the
information that they have readily available, rather than the
candidates themselves.
6. This measurement and definition of ‘marginality’ is a com-
monly used and agreed definition throughout British politics
literature, see for example Johnston and Pattie (2011), Norris
and Lovenduski (1995), Sobolewska (2013), and Curtice
et al. (2018).
7. The British Election Study, British Social Attitudes survey,
the European Values Study, the European Social Survey, and
the World Values Study
8. See figure and associated discussion in Online Appendix.
9. See Online Appendix for further detail and discussion on alter-
native procedures.
10. Theoretically, lower units of analysis could be leveraged by
using intensive and complicated computational processes to
establish estimates of opinion at the parliamentary constitu-
ency level – namely, multilevel regression and post-
stratification (Lauderdale et al., 2020). This was however
outside the scope of this research – see Online Appendix for
discussion on this and other reasons in favour of measuring
and estimating at the regional level.
11. See outlines provided by Eurostat: http://ec.europa.eu/euro
stat/web/nuts/overview.
12. The specific population density of each region would have
been the ideal figure to use here, but perhaps rather unsurpris-
ingly, this variable correlated at 91% with the ethnic diversity
metric and so was unsuitable to use in the regression analysis.
13. It might be argued that seats without a retiring incumbent
should be excluded altogether from the analysis. However,
this was not deemed appropriate in this context – see Online
Appendix for discussion.
14. It could be argued that the structure of the data demands a
hierarchical modelling process, with the observations (party-
level minority candidates in winnable positions) being nested
within regions, and then time. However, theoretically this is
not altogether correct in this instance, and mathematically pro-
blematic given the small number of groupings and the highly
(overly) complex equation that the model would be asked to fit
(Stegmueller, 2013). That said, the Online Appendix does con-
tain two multilevel model estimates by way of robustness
check, and a full discussion of the (in)appropriateness of using
these models to develop research conclusions in this context.
15. Rather than suppress the intercept and estimate means for
each year, the panel dummies control for the relative change
in the average count of candidates in winnable positions since
year zero (1997). This impacts the way that the panel dum-
mies should be interpreted, and also the rest of the regression
coefficients – namely, that the relative change rather than
absolute value of overall winnable candidates being fielded
in each election year is controlled for.
16. Comparable data for Scotland pre-2005, when substantial
boundary changes occurred, is not available. This brings the
total number of observations down to 150 from 154. For the
2010 change in English and Welsh constituency boundaries,
indicative results from the Press Association are used.
17. Priors from a normal distribution with a mean of zero and
standard deviation of 1 were set for all model parameters
apart from the count data for open seats – normal(0,0.5). The
priors were established after experimentation and simulation
in line with the suggested Poisson work flow demonstrated by
McElreath (2020). The size of these priors would be very
restrictive in a linear setting, but in count modelling when
transformed into the exponential scale would imply expected
beta values of between around 3 and 3.
18. The traditional 95% level is not normally deemed stable and
reliable enough for credible intervals (McElreath, 2020), and
intervals of around 90% are as such usually preferred in
Bayesian inference. Rather than the arbitrary figure of 90,
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McElreath suggests we use the slightly-less arbitrary figure of
89, as it is the highest prime number below the 95 interval.
19. As well as here at the 89% level, they also do not cross zero at the
95% or 99% intervals, as can be seen in the Online Appendix.
20. Rather than with confidence intervals, Bayesian credible
intervals do allow us to make probability statements about
the estimates.
21. See Online Appendix.
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